Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for returning to this issue. Noble Lords will recall that on Report we had a bit of confusion about the power of re-entry and about whether judicial authority should be available in that context. Noble Lords might recall, too, that one of the concerns was that some of the advice agencies were worried that if judicial authority were needed for re-entry to be enabled, that might encourage some bailiffs to take goods on the first visit. I have been looking at that, and we are in discussion with the industry and with the advice services. We have powers in paragraph 13(3) of Schedule 12 and paragraph 24(1) of Schedule 12 that would enable me to look at that through regulations to ensure that we deal with it appropriately when, for example, we are ensuring that we set out the criteria that should be followed the first time that people enter premises, so that it does not become a matter of course that they take goods on that first visit. Also, that would make getting judicial authority for a re-entry as simple and easy as possible, thereby reducing the incentive to take goods on the first visit. I wanted to say that at the beginning, because that was an area that we discussed at length, and I hope that I have tackled that. I hope that I can give the noble Lord some comfort on Amendment No. 19. I know that he feels very strongly about this, and we have had discussions about the restraining of the debtor and of anyone else who is preventing an enforcement agent from taking control of goods to carry out their lawful duties. I want to reiterate what I said on Report, as it may in some ways help to solve the noble Lord's problem. The regulations made under paragraphs 24(2) and 31(5) of Schedule 12 will be drawn up only after consultation with the advice sector and with the enforcement industry—and that is another commitment. If after such consultation the consensus is that existing powers are sufficient, we will reconsider our position. I shall ensure that the noble Lord knows about that. However, I do not want to lose the flexibility in the Bill because, although some organisations have been concerned about it, others feel strongly that it is very important to set this out properly so that those who have to use the restraining powers do so properly and appropriately. We need to have that conversation; depending on the outcome, I shall undertake to act appropriately and accordingly and keep the noble Lord informed. Amendment No. 16, as the noble Lord says, replicates the current law in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which is inserted by the Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Act 2004. The powers target those who have been convicted of a criminal offence, fined and who subsequently refuse to engage with the courts and pay the fine. It cannot be right that someone who has committed a criminal offence and received a sentence imposed by the courts can evade justice simply by refusing to open the door to an enforcement agent going about his lawful business. For a long time, non-payment of fines has been treated differently from non-payment of civil debts, with imprisonment still being available ultimately as a sanction for fine default. We think it is important to retain the powers set out in Schedule 4A to the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 as a key component of the enforcement tools available to those who have responsibility for enforcing criminal fines. In my earlier comments about how I intend to approach the matter I dealt with Amendments Nos. 17 and 18. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that.I shall not refer to the technicalities of these amendments for the precise reasons mentioned by the nobleLord. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, was kind enough to let me have his speaking note. I am the Minister responsible for freedom of information in the department. As the noble Lord knows, we have, under the Freedom of Information Act, the ability to withhold information, on the ground that sharing guidance to civilian enforcement officers on what to do in specific situations would prejudice the administration of justice. We think that the disclosure of methods used by enforcement agencies could assist defaulters to evade enforcement officers in the execution of their duties. That is why specific paragraphs were withheld. There is a risk that making the guidance more widely available would give an inappropriate advantage to defaulters by giving them an insight into the techniques used by enforcement officers. We are concerned to avoid a situation where our guidance is used by defaulters to avoid enforcement officers and, subsequently, their duty to pay financial penalties. Of course, fines need to be enforced effectively. Wider publication of the guidance could impinge on the efficiency of the enforcement activity, and on that basis exemptions under Section 31(1)(c) of the FOI Act apply. There is no possibility, which I know the noble Lord is concerned about, of any other Government slipping in or implementing the provisions, as the regulations under paragraphs 24(2) and 31(5) of Schedule 12 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I think that if the Reverend Nicholson, who was in receipt of the letter, is discontent with the responses that he has had so far, he is entitled to pursue the matter with the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas. I hope that the noble Lord is satisfied with my answers.