Concessionary Bus Travel Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 1: 1: Clause 1 , page 1, line 13, leave out ““bus”” and insert ““public service vehicle”” The noble Lord said: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 15, 18, 21 to 24, 27 and 28. These are minor technical amendments intended to clarify or improve the drafting of the Bill, together with a concessionary amendment addressing a point raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the Bill. Amendments Nos. 1 and 18 are needed because, in two places in the Bill, we have used the word ““bus”” when we should have used, for consistency with the Acts being amended—the Transport Act 2000 and the Greater London Authority Act 1999—the technical expression ““public service vehicle””. Those amendments, however, change neither the definitions of ““public service vehicle”” or ““eligible service”” nor the substance of the definition of ““eligible journey””. We tabled Amendment No. 15 to put beyond doubt the fact that more generous concessions can be provided within London, should the boroughs and TfL agree them. Currently the wording of the change to the Greater London Authority Act 1999 made by Clause 6(2)(b) might be read as preventing more generous concessions being granted to London residents than the concession specified in Clause 6(4). That has never been our intention. Londoners already get concessions that are in some respects more generous. Amendment No. 15 ensures that there is no doubt about that. It is not in any way a policy change. Amendments Nos. 21 and 22 are needed because Clause 7(2)(b) replaces the words, "““issued to him in accordance with the arrangements””," in Section 243(1)(b) of the 1999 Act with some new words, which do not include any equivalent of the words ““to him””. These amendments therefore insert the words ““to the person”” to rectify that error. Again, there are no policy implications. Amendment No. 23 changes the word ““document”” to ““permit”” in the definition of ““travel concession permit”” in Section 243(5) of the 1999 Act. This is to avoid any argument that smart cards or perhaps certain types of smart card do not readily fall within the description ““document””. Although the meaning of ““document”” may be thought to have the flavour of a piece of paper or something similar with writing on it, ““permit”” does not have the same connotation and is consistent with the rest of the legislation. Amendments Nos. 27 and 28 merely add a signpost to Section 162 of the Transport Act 2000, the general interpretation section for Part 2 of that Act, to the new definition of ““London Authority”” inserted by Clause 2(2). That definition already applies for the purpose of Part 2 of the Act so there is no changeof any substance. The inclusion of a signpost in Section 162 is consistent with the general approach taken in that provision. We have given careful consideration to the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the Bill, and I am grateful to it for its work. Amendment No. 24 addresses a point raised at paragraph 13 of the report. The committee commented on Clause 9(3)(g), regarding the regulation-making powers of the Secretary of State should he make an order to take over responsibility for the reimbursement of bus operators. We had an interesting debate in Grand Committee about the wider purpose of Clause 9, and I see no reason for this amendment to reignite that debate. Instead, its purpose is simply to improve the clarity of the Bill as it sets out the specific powers provided by Clause 9(3). The amendment now limits, via proposed new paragraph (f) in Clause 9(3), the scope of the regulation-making powers that an order made under Clause 9(1)(a) can confer on the Secretary of State. It also requires at proposed new subsection (3A) any such regulations to be subject to the negative resolution procedure. This maintains the existing procedure for regulations relating to reimbursement and appeals matters as set out in the Transport Act 2000. New Clause 9(3)(f) enables regulation-making powers to be conferred on the Secretary of State that correspond with or are similar to the Secretary of State’s existing regulation-making powers in Sections 149(3), 150(6) and 156(7) of the 2000 Act. It also includes a sweep-up provision to cater for other ancillary matters for which regulations might be needed, for example for how to claim a reimbursement. As the scope of the regulation-making power is now more specific, we have also sought to be more specific about the kind of amendments to the 2000 Act that an order under Clause 9(1)(a) might make by virtue of Clause 9(3). In particular,we hope that the wording of the proposed newClause 9(3)(b), by referring to ““altering”” current provisions about appeals, will reassure the House that there will be an appeal mechanism, should the power to centralise reimbursement ever be used. I hope, therefore, that Amendment No. 24 reassures the House of our intentions. In drafting these amendments, our intention is to make the Bill more accurate and explicit, and I hope it will be recognised that we have achieved that goal. Accordingly, I beg to move.