Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My Lords, I, too, support the intentions of the Bill, as there is concern—not only from trade unions, one of which I worked for over many years—about the inadequacy of current legislation when deaths occur as a result of the failings of organisations. Despite a number of major incidents, some of which have already been referred to, which are still all too vivid in the memory and which involved large organisations, the only successful prosecutions, which have been small in number, have been against small companies. In those cases, first of all, a directing mind of the organisation has been identified who is also guilty of the offenceof manslaughter. But in large corporations thereare more complex structures as well as devolved functions, which make it effectively impossible under the present legal criteria to identify a directing mind who is also guilty of manslaughter, which is required before a successful prosecution for manslaughter against such a corporation can be achieved. Under the Bill, the new offence of corporate manslaughter will be dependent not on the guilt of one or more individuals but on whether the activities of an organisation have been managed or organised in a way that amounts to a gross breach of the dutyto take reasonable care for a person’s safety, and which causes the person’s death. One key questionis whether the potential sanctions against an organisation convicted under the Bill will be sufficient to improve safety, bearing in mind that those sanctions—an unlimited fine or a remedial order—appear no different from those already available under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 when a death has occurred. The only fines that will change attitudes, when those attitudes are in need of change, are onesthat impact significantly on the finances of an organisation and thus cause directors to face awkward questions from shareholders about their stewardship and competence. The likelihood of such fines being imposed, bearing in mind the experience under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, is debatable. Would it not be advisable to have other sanctions available that might impact more directly on those at the highest level in a company that has been found guilty of manslaughter? As other noble Lords have asked, should it not be possible to consider disqualification of the directors most involved or naming and shaming the companies concerned? After all, we are talking about gross negligence as a result of which people have died. We are talking not about instances of less than effective management but about something far more serious and less frequent. The Government do not anticipate many cases: 10 to 13 additional cases of corporate manslaughter or homicide a year following implementation of the offence. Perhaps consideration should be given, too, to placing companies found guilty of the new offence under some form of probation. Such sanctions are far more likely to spur into action company boards that do not keep a proper grip on the management of safety than a fine, which may seem huge to the person in the street but is small in relation to the company’s turnover or profitability. This Bill is about making it easier to bring corporations to justice following a fatality when there is gross negligence. It does not address the role of individual directors. Is it the Government’s intention, in order to make the new offence of corporate manslaughter more effective, to take steps as soon as possible to place on directors a statutory duty to take all reasonable steps to comply with health and safety obligations? After all, it is not organisations thatkill people but the actions of people in those organisations. High standards of safety are not achieved simply by putting in appropriate processes and procedures and ticking the appropriate boxes when that is done; they are also about culture and attitudes throughout an organisation—culture and attitudes determined by the actions and approach of senior management. If directors are not to be held directly to account when their decisions and approach have led to the gross negligence that has resulted in a fatality, it is less likely that those who need to do so will take the necessary preventive measures to ensure that such deaths do not occur in the first place. There is value, especially when lives are at stake, in deterrent measures against a gross breach of duty of care. The Joint Select Committee in the other place that looked at the draft Bill recommended that it should establish secondary liability for those who connive, conspire or collude in an act that results in death. It argued that under the draft Bill there would be a gap in the law when individuals in a company had contributed to the offence of corporate manslaughter but there was insufficient evidence to prove that they were guilty of individual gross negligence manslaughter. From April 1999 to virtually the present only 15 directors or business owners were personally convicted of this offence. The Government rejected the recommendation from the Joint Select Committee. I hope that at some stage the Minister will be able to comment on why the Government consider such an approach to be unacceptable and inconsistent with the objective of the Bill, which is surely to further enhance safety and reduce the number of deaths from gross negligence. In any legislation of this nature, one must ensure that it will not impose unnecessary additional burdens, responsibilities or costs on those affected. Bearing in mind the low number of additional cases that the Government anticipate as a result of the Bill and the fact that it is aimed at creating a new statutory offence of corporate manslaughter by gross negligence, which will replace the common-law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence with regard to corporations, it can hardly be argued that it will impose such additional burdens, responsibilities or costs. The Bill should make an important contribution to further improving safety if it makes corporations more effectively accountable under the law than they are at present for major failings that result in death. The likelihood of facing a successful prosecution can help to concentrate minds and change attitudes at the highest levels in those organisations when safety isnot given the consideration and prominence that it should receive. If the result of the Bill is to reduce the number and magnitude of incidents resulting in deaths through gross negligence, it will have achieved its main objective. Even in respect of those incidents that continue to occur, the Bill may enable the relatives and friends of those who have died to feel that justice has been done through making somewhat easier the successful prosecution of companies that have seriously failed in their duty of care. Major safety failings cost money as well as lives. High safety standards cannot be achieved on the cheap, but compared with the cost of a major incident in lost lives, lost business and lost reputation, delivering such standards represents real value for money. I believe that the Bill will further enhance safety and save lives but, unless the Minister can persuade me to the contrary, I think that it could be made even more effective in that regard.