UK Parliament / Open data

Legal Services Bill [HL]

Proceeding contribution from Lord Neill of Bladen (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 6 December 2006. It occurred during Debate on bills on Legal Services Bill [HL].
My Lords, I declare my interest. I am a practising member of the Bar; for some years I was on the Bar Council and I was once chairman of the Bar. I was also a member of the Joint Committee of both Houses which considered this Bill. It was a very interesting process. There are two things to be said about it. On the first point, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, was a little inaccurate when he gave all the praise to the committee members and not himself. No doubt that was modesty, but he was a fantastic chairman of the committee and managed to lead us down paths of tranquillity, which might have been of a different character but for his benign and skilful influence on the conduct of our affairs. The second point, which I believe the Government have taken on board, is that the time allowed for the preparation of the report was inadequate. At one time we wondered whether we should carry on, because it was uphill work, since we started from scratch and there were a whole lot of background papers to be read. We had to decide which witnesses we wanted to call; we then had to give them time to prepare, call them and then consider the great body of evidence and the written material coming in. To do all that in eight weeks is very tough going. I respectfully suggest that it really should not happen again. I think that that has been taken on board. I shall deal with one or two major themes. On the independence theme, I know that to a great extent I am preaching to the converted, but it is important. An aspect arises out of one or two observations that have been made. What we do with this Bill is being watched in other countries to see whether we are doing anything that will destroy the perception of independence of this country’s Bar. Frankly, in other countries jealous eyes are cast on the huge success of our legal profession. If it could be shown that it had ceased to be independent, perhaps road blocks could be put in its path. The president of the Law Societyis much exercised by this matter. We should not ignore it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell of Markyate, referred to the importance of having an independent legal profession. It is vitally important that people should be willing to take up difficult cases and have the moral courage to appear in cases where the forces of power are rallied on the other side. Nothing must be done that alters that. I draw attention to two points in that regard. A very good paper was produced. The only matter in which I played any part in the committee concerned my asking whether the Bar Council could produce a paper on the duty owed to the court by advocates. An excellent paper, which appears on page 70 of volume II of our work, was the response to that request. It has two striking elements. I am ashamed to say that I was not aware that the measure was already embodied in a statute of 1999. One of the Law Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who was present earlier but had to leave to attend to other duties, commented on the matter in a very good passage. The relevant statute is the Access to Justice Act 1999, Section 27 of which provides that every duly authorised advocate has a duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice. That is already a statutory requirement. While not talking about the Act specifically but referring more generally to Hall v Simons 2000, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said: "““While the advocate owes a duty to his client, he is also under a duty to assist the administration of justice ... his duty to the court and to the public requires that he must be free, in the conduct of his client’s case at all times, to exercise his independent judgment as to what is required to serve the interests of justice. He is not bound by the wishes of his client in that respect, and the mere fact that he has declined to do what his client wishes will not expose him to any kind of liability””." That is an extreme manifestation. You get cases where you come across an authority you previously did not know—a decided case—which is dead against you but your duty is to inform the court. If you come across a highly embarrassing document, every dishonest instinct might tell you to shred it. Your duty is to hand it over, but by so doing you lose the case. The client is not very pleased, but that is your duty. Those are the rules of the game. I am pleased that the Government have gone a long way to meet us on this. Following one of our recommendations, they have included in the Bill’s general principles, the regulatory objectives, the adjective ““independent”” in Clause 1(1)(e). Again following one of our recommendations, the duty to the court has been added in Clause 1(3)(d). So far, so good. However, noble Lords would not expect my entire speech to be full of praise. We suggested that the regulatory objectives ought to include a reference to the public interest, with words such as ““protecting and promoting the public interest””. That has not been accepted in full, although possibly we will pick up references to the public interest elsewhere. The committee would like to have seen that put squarely on the front of the Bill. What are the threats to the perception of independence? I identify three, most of which have been identified already. The first is the appointment of the chairman of the Legal Services Board. The Joint Committee, following Sir David, was very keen on involving the higher judiciary. There would be no better person now than the Lord Chief Justice. With great respect to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, I cannot accept the populist view is that the Lord Chief Justice is regarded by the public as just another lawyer. He happens to be the head of the legal profession, and he would have attained that position only after an impeccable and very successful career as a lawyer and as a man of the greatest possible integrity. In other contexts, we rely and depend on him. So the view that he would be unacceptable as a person who must be consulted is completely wrong and mistaken. I have begun to think that we should have gone a bit further than ““consult””. We should perhaps have said, ““with the concurrence of”” the Lord Chief Justice on the appointment. For my part, I would go further. I do not see why, once the original appointment has been made and you have a reappointment, you should not just have the Lord Chief Justice as the appointing body. He should certainly be involved in the appointment. That is the first possible threat to the perceived independence. The second thing would be to have a very interventionist Legal Services Board. Sir David Clementi talked about a ““light touch””. If I had been a parliamentary draftsman and someone said to me, ““Would you mind putting in some words to say that there has got to be a light touch?””, I would not find that very easy to do. We see the direct opposite of the light touch in the power of intervention to give directions, which has already been mentioned. That appears in Clause 31(1)(a). The intervention can take place if the board perceives that there has been a threat to any one of the objectives in the principles set out in Clause 1. As noble Lords know, there are about seven of them, and if we get our way there will eventually be eight. To some extent, they point in different directions. Many possible actions taken by a regulatory authority could be thought to be a threat to one or other of them. That needs to be changed by amendment in Committee to make the trigger for intervention more difficult. Thirdly, there is the matter that has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt; our recommendation concerned with the frequent use of the term, ““the Secretary of State shall have power to do x, y and z””, right through the alphabet. I had not done the arithmetic that the noble Lord has carried out to see that they double the figure. I am a bit surprised, because the Government responded to our criticism by saying: "““The Government accepts that it should reconsider whether each of the powers proposed for the Secretary of State in the draft Bill is necessary, and [is] currently working with stakeholders to review this””." The stakeholders must have come along with shovels and added very great deal more in the way of the need for the Secretary of State. That has got to be looked at. My next area for discussion is complaints. The Bar has had some of these; the figure that it gives is that3 per cent of complaints against the legal profession come to the Bar. It has a pretty good record withthe Legal Services Ombudsman, which has been mentioned. The thing to concentrate on is the supposed possible split between complaints that relate to service and those relating to conduct. The Bar’s evidence to us is that 70 per cent are hybrid, with allegations of bad service and bad conduct. It would be absurd to have two different bodies; to have an ombudsman looking at part of it and the Bar conduct regulator people looking at something else. Some flexibility is required, as is a power to hand over to the Bar the combined issue that arises on a case, if it is thought appropriate. For example, how do you classify a case where the client says, ““I want you to call X. He’s a star witness; he’ll win the case for us””, and the barrister has his own good reasons for thinking that would be a disaster and refuses to call him? Is that service or conduct? It is only one example; we might be able to come up with the answer to it, but I am sure that I could come back with others that are impossible to clarify as truly one or the other. Flexibility must be brought into the Bill, so that the matter can be transferred to the professionals. We should watch carefully the dogma that professionals cannot be trusted to judge professionals. As a junior barrister, I used to appear in front of various bodies of professionals on behalf of some miscreant professional, and I constantly failed. It may have been my fault, but they were the toughest bunch. If you appeared in front of a lot of surveyors to try to acquit, in the old days, a chartered surveyor on a charge of advertising, or similarly in front of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, you had a snowball’s chance in hell. It is a complete fallacy that such bodies are not to be trusted; they are very tough. The ““polluter must pay”” doctrine cannot be fair or right. It cannot stand up to any outside scrutiny that a man who has a false charge made against him has to pay the costs of the proceedings. I have a concern on how the costs will add up and escalate. At the moment, we have an estimate of£20 million for set-up and another of £20 million for the annual charge, so you start year 1 at £40 million and have the professions paying under the present scheme without any government contribution. We do not want another Dome—I think I can safely say that; the noble and learned Lord has withdrawn—or another Olympic city, with the estimates being blown through the roof. We must try to exercise control, and the Government ought to contribute largely to set-up costs and annually to the annual costs.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

687 c1182-5 

Session

2006-07

Chamber / Committee

House of Lords chamber
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