Animal Welfare Bill

My Lords, I confirm that that is the case. I assure the noble Baroness that we consider the matter to be covered by the Bill. As we have not convinced the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, before I use my set piece I shall address the seductive point that she raised regarding the Zoo Licensing Act, on which I have taken advice. The noble Baroness said that the Zoo Licensing Act provided a list of domesticated and non-domesticated animals. This list, however, is not an authoritative statement. The guidance is explicit—the list is the department’s informal view of what animals might be classed as wild animals for the purpose of the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 (as amended). Under this legislation ““wild animals”” means animals not normally domesticated in Great Britain. It was felt necessary to provide this guidance to aid authorities in determining what types of establishment might require a zoo licence under the 1981 Act. For example, a collection of animals consisting entirely of types normally domesticated in Great Britain is not a zoo within the meaning of the Act. This list was not drawn up to highlight welfare differences between the species mentioned. Indeed, the Secretary of State’s Standards of Modern Zoo Practice guidance is equally clear that the welfare needs of animals in zoos can be met by adhering to the five freedoms drawn up for livestock by the Farm Animal Welfare Council, which are broadly reflected in the five welfare needs as highlighted in this clause. The amendment seeks to add a further paragraph to Clause 9. Its central aim is to instruct a court that in considering whether a welfare offence has been committed it should have regard to the degree of domestication of an animal. We do not think that the amendment is necessary because these issues will be dealt with by a court as appropriate under the legislation as drafted. The special needs of some animals kept by man were discussed at length in Grand Committee. We were all agreed that different animals have different needs and therefore required different kinds and degrees of care. We also debated amendments that sought to instruct the courts to take into account whether an animal was non-domesticated. I confirm to one noble Baroness and reassure the other that whether an animal is of a kind commonly regarded as domesticated or non-domesticated will be an inherent consideration in ascertaining what its needs are under Clause 9(2), for the purpose of determining whether its needs have been met. It is entirely appropriate for a court to take that into account. It would be unacceptable to seek to ascertain a non-domesticated animal’s needs without having regard to the fact that they are of a species that is not commonly domesticated in the British islands, where this is relevant. However, it will not always be relevant, and it could therefore be a mistake to require a court always to have regard to it. For example, if a prosecution was brought because an owner failed to provide water for their animal, the amendment would require the degree of domestication of the animal to be taken into account, even though that is not relevant. All animals need water, and a failure to provide water for an animal for which you are responsible would breach the offence, whether or not the animal is domesticated. To this extent, the amendment could cause confusion and legally be a problem. I assure the House that the clause as drafted does allow the courts to contemplate ““degrees of domestication””—it is for the court to decide—as one of the circumstances in deciding whether the offence has been breached. By highlighting the degree of domestication, the amendment risks narrowing the clause by implication, because that factor and not others is mentioned. There is potentially a really serious problem in seeking to limit the clause in this way. It should also not be assumed that non-domesticated species necessarily have more complex needs than domesticated species; they are clearly different. The regulations and codes of practice that we produce will provide greater clarity about what is required for particular types of animal, including non-domesticated species. The codes will provide, if necessary, any additional guidance that may be needed to ensure the welfare of non-domesticated animals. If necessary, there is a power in Clause 12 to make regulations setting specific requirements with regard to a particular animal’s needs, so it is covered in the Bill in a double lock. Clause 9 makes it implicit and inherent that the needs will be taken into account by the courts. In Clause 12, there is the power to make regulations setting a specific requirement with regard to a particular animal’s needs. What exactly constitutes the appropriate welfare standard will vary according to the circumstances, and the Bill already requires the courts to consider all the circumstances. After careful consideration and scrutiny by Parliament, we have formulated a clause that is as flexible and as capable as possible of addressing the needs of all types of animals—we are concerned about them all—for which a person may be responsible in the many different circumstances that may arise. The flexibility is needed for the courts to do their job so that, if you like, those who wish not to treat animals properly cannot find legalistic loopholes in a clause that is drafted a bit too narrowly because it does not allow the courts to look at all the circumstances. On that basis, I sincerely urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.