Police and Justice Bill

My Lords, I was so carried away by our agreement that I forgot to explain properly to the noble Lord why his amendment is unnecessary and how it will work. That would give a deal of comfort not only to the noble Lord but to others outside this House interested in the matter—and I am sure that is why he raised it. Amendment No. 141 relates to the provisions which would give the Court of Appeal discretion to direct that an appellant who is in custody should appear by means of a live link rather than in person. The amendment would require the consent of the appellant to appear by way of a live link before any such direction could be made. That would cause some difficulty in the procedure. Giving the Court of Appeal the power to direct use of a live link will have several advantages, including improved security for prisoners, particularly those in category A, requiring the highest security, who will not need to be accommodated at court; reducing prison escort costs—noble Lords have discussed on a number of occasions the difficulties with moving people around—and reducing pressure on overstretched London prisons caused by the transfer of prisoners located in prisons outside London for appeal hearings. We expect that the appellant will indicate his or her preference for the method of appearance when making the application for leave to appeal, and that the court will have regard to this before making a direction. Introducing a requirement of consent, thereby allowing prisoners to insist on appearing in person, would potentially undermine the benefits and result in high costs and possible delays for the criminal justice system. The amendment would also introduce a requirement that the court should be satisfied that the live link direction is not contrary to the interests of justice. We do not consider it necessary to be overly prescriptive in the nature of the power. The court already has an overriding obligation to ensure that an appellant receives a fair hearing in accordance with Article 6. Furthermore, the Criminal Procedure Rules require the court to further the overriding objective when exercising any power given to it by legislation. This means that criteria which by definition equate to the interests of justice are automatically imported into the exercise of the court's discretion in procedural decisions. The court will therefore always exercise the proposed power in accordance with the interests of justice and the appellant’s right to a fair hearing. I know that those are the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, is particularly concerned about—and rightly so. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the noble Lord will not press his amendment.