Children and Adoption Bill [Lords]

We are facing up to this. It is one reason why the Bill introduces a range of measures, including contact activities. It gives CAFCASS a new and broader role in befriending couples who are going through separation. To take all of that into account, I think that the hon. Gentleman would probably wish to review what he has said and the way in which he said it. The Bill is an effective measure. I think that all Members in this place and the other place have agreed with that during its passage. Amendment No. 10 is identical to the proposition that was debated in Committee. During that debate, Opposition Members clarified that they had meant to omit paragraph 6(d) from new section 110. Unfortunately, they made the same mistake again. That being so, the effect of amendment No. 10 is to continue to allow the child concerned to apply for a financial compensation order to remove the safeguards that would be attached to the application. However, I will proceed on the basis of the intention, which is to prevent the child from applying for a financial compensation order. I think that that is where the Opposition wish to be. I sympathise with the concern that children should not become involved in what are essentially pecuniary proceedings, involving usually their parents. I doubt that many children will apply for financial compensation when one of the parties to the proceedings has breached a contact order to which they are subject. That said, there may be a few cases where a child has spent his or her own money to attend contact that did not take place. I imagine that these cases will be few and far between. Nonetheless, they are a possibility, and that is why they have been accounted for. Amendment No. 16 would require a court that is considering making an enforcement order to make an order for the separate representation of the child, unless satisfied that it is not necessary to do so to safeguard the child’s interests. I do not necessarily agree that that is best done by having separate representation of children in all enforcement proceedings, as amendment No.16 proposes. I have already had discussions with my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) in private. The court can already, under existing provisions, consider separate representation of children, not just at enforcement stage but throughout Children Act 1989 proceedings. Under rule 9.5 of the family proceedings rules, the court may appoint a guardian for the child if it appears that it is in the best interests of the child for him or her to be made a party to the proceedings. That rule will apply also in respect of enforcement orders. In April 2004, the president of the family division issued practice direction outlining the circumstances in which the court could consider making a child a party to the proceedings. Those include where the child has a standpoint or an interest that cannot be adequately represented by the other parties, where there is an intractable dispute over contact or residence and where there are serious allegations of physical, sexual or other abuse in relation to that child. The Cardiff university research report draws attention to the disadvantages of separate representation—for example, increased delay, additional stress and confusion to the child, which I think is particularly important and potentially too great a weight of responsibility on what are very young children. Important factors should be weighed up each time a court considers making an order for the separate representation of a child. Amendments Nos. 18 and 21 would affect a court’s deliberations in deciding whether someone had a reasonable excuse to breach a contact order. Amendment No. 18 would make the welfare of the child paramount in such decisions. Amendment No. 21 would require the court to consider the child’s wishes and feelings and any concerns about the child’s safety or, indeed, the safety of any member of the family. I am happy to repeat that a reasonable excuse could include a genuine fear of domestic violence, whether to the adult or the child. In so far as ensuring that the courts have sufficient regard to child protection issues, the change proposed is not necessary. Similarly, the court will already take into account the safety of another adult. We should also bear it in mind that not all reasonable excuses involve domestic violence. A medical emergency could be the reason why an order was breached, in which case the considerations in the amendments would not be appropriate. Amendment No. 11 would require the court, in considering whether to make an enforcement order, to have regard to the principle that the court should act on the presumption that a child’s welfare is best served by reasonable contact with both parents in the absence of a good reason to the contrary. However, the principle is said to be subject to the welfare of the child. In effect, that requires the court to operate subject to a presumption of reasonable contact in deciding whether to make an enforcement order in response to the breach of a contact order. In our view, it would be especially inappropriate to insert a presumption in that context. The original contact order would have already involved the court in considering the welfare of the child as paramount. When presented with enforcement issues, the concern of the court should simply be whether enforcement is necessary and proportionate to secure compliance with a contact order. The matter of what is in the child’s best interests will have been considered already. I have said already that this is a diverse set of amendments. I hope that I have explained why we would have difficulty in accepting them. I urge hon. Members not to press them to a vote.