Animal Welfare Bill

I hope that I can satisfy the noble Baroness on these points by drawing her attention to the fact that the courts do not have to order the destruction of such animals. Clause 37(1) states:"““The court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under section 8(1) or (2) may order””." This is a discretionary power, not a compulsory provision. I state that as an opening gambit because the noble Baroness’s remarks seem to be predicated on the assumption that the court has to order the destruction of the fighting animal. While that may be so in most cases, it is not a requirement. The amendment would render the whole of Clause 37 meaningless and unnecessary in view of the Bill’s other post-conviction powers. The clause provides an additional power that was not available under the 1911 Act. It has the effect of extending a similar power, as in the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, to fighting animals. The Dangerous Dogs Act allows for a destruction order but does not deal with destruction after a fighting conviction. It is important to ensure that the courts have all the possible means of dealing with fighting animals at their disposal. It is also important to allow the courts discretion to deal with animals that are in the hands of offenders once they have been convicted. We do not want them to be able to engage in complicated arguments about the interests of the animals they own to thwart a court order for confiscation. Sadly, and I accept this as a fact, there are fighting animals who are perfectly fit and healthy but which could not be sold or rehomed. Indeed, that probably applies to the majority, if not all of them, so the court should have a degree of discretion. If the court can make destruction orders only in the interests of the animal, we will still have to ask ourselves what is to be done with fighting animals. Do we want to accept the consequences of having them remain in the community or do we accept the consequences for their welfare if they have to be locked up until they die a natural death? Provided that they are dealt with humanely and appropriately, we do not see that the destruction of fighting animals is a problem, but again I enter the caveat that the court does not have to make that decision, even though in the majority of cases it will do so. However, it is probably preferable to destroy a dangerous animal than to risk allowing it back into the community or to accept the welfare consequences of locking it away for the rest of its life. There is a concern that Clause 37 provides the only post-conviction power relating to fighting animals; that if an animal has been involved in a fight, its destruction is automatic. However, that is not the case because of the provision in Clause 37(1). If a convicted person owns the animal, he can be deprived of it under Clause 32 and the animal disposed of under that clause. That does not mean only destruction. Whether the convicted person owns the animal or not, if the animal is injured and suffering, it can be destroyed in its own interests under Clause 36. Clause 37 is not a single route for dealing with fighting animals, but one of many. It provides an additional power that was not available under the 1911 Act, but which we think is necessary for the courts. My central point is that it will not be compulsory to destroy a fighting animal, even though that may be the decision reached in the majority of cases. Although the court may decide to order destruction, it does not have to do so.