Animal Welfare Bill

I take what the noble Duke said in his opening remarks about the impeccable credentials of where this amendment has come from, but to be honest I could not commend it to noble Lords. It would be difficult to enforce and of very little value in ensuring that animal welfare needs are met. I will try and explain why. The amendment would have the effect of closing what appears to be a potential loophole. A person convicted of, for example, cruelty to an animal can be prevented from undertaking certain activities related to animals but not others. The disqualification provisions are intended to protect animals from the harm which could be caused to them if someone who has previously caused harm to animals is allowed to take on significant responsibility for their care. In those cases where there is not necessarily another person involved in the activity, we feel that it is necessary for the courts to be able to take steps to protect animals from possible abuse. The terms of Clause 33 are already broad and include disqualification from being party to an arrangement under which a person is entitled to control or influence the way animals are kept. That might conceivably include riding a horse on a pony-trekking holiday or running boarding kennels. Disqualification is intended to prevent people acquiring responsibility for an animal. It cannot operate to prevent each and every opportunity for a convicted person to come into contact with or be cruel to an animal if that is what they are intent on doing. With the best will in the world, it is impossible to extend the disqualification provision to all of the activities in which a person may interact with an animal. For example, we do not think it is feasible to disqualify a person from visiting an open farm or a zoo. Further, under this amendment a court would no longer be able to disqualify someone from just keeping or owning an animal. It would have to disqualify them from the whole range of activities listed in Clause 32(2). We believe that in many cases it would be grossly disproportionate and would actually discourage the courts from issuing disqualification orders in the first place. For example, as happens all too often, someone with the best of intentions might take on a few animals, take on a few more and then more until they are unable to cope and the welfare of those animals they have sought to help actually deteriorates. In such a case the court might want to issue a disqualification order to prevent the compulsive collector of animals getting into the same situation again. However, to oblige the court also to disqualify that person from taking charge of animals for any purpose and for any length of time could be disastrous. The person concerned, who with the best will in the world wanted to look after animals, would be prevented from being able to hold a dog’s lead if they went for a walk with a friend. That cannot be fair or right, and is grossly disproportionate. In such circumstances I would not commend the amendment because it would be difficult to enforce and, what is more, of little value to animal welfare. If a provision is unenforceable and easy to circumvent, we should not consider it. The proposed amendment would be open to such criticism and therefore I cannot commend it to the Committee.