Animal Welfare Bill

We believe these amendments stem from a misconception about how the Bill’s post-conviction powers fit together. When a person has been convicted of an offence under the Bill and he is the owner of the animal which was the subject of an offence, that animal can be confiscated. If the court decides to disqualify him, it can order that the animal and any others that he owns or keeps can be seized under Clause 34. When the animal has been seized under Clauses 32 or 34, it can then be disposed of. This might be through sale, re-homing, destruction, or other disposal. It follows that the court must have a power to order the destruction of animals under these two clauses, even where it is not in the animal’s interests. The animals seized might be farm animals, in which case it is ordinary practice to send them for slaughter. Or the conviction might have been for animal fighting, in which case it may be appropriate to destroy the animals in the interests of public safety. In dealing with animals under these clauses we believe it is important that we do not tie the hands of the courts in enforcing the law. In the majority of cases the court will want to consider the interests of the animals concerned, and an order for disposal following seizure will almost certainly be in accordance with the animal’s best interests. But that may not be the only factor to take into account, and sometimes animals may have to be destroyed once they have been removed. Amendments Nos. 121 and 122 concern the duty of the court to give reasons for its decision whether to impose a deprivation order. Amendment No. 122 would impose a duty to give reasons in all circumstances and Amendment No. 121 would remove the duty altogether. Subsection (7) was included in Clause 32 to ensure that where a court decides that a person who has been convicted of cruelty, mutilation, poisoning, animal fighting or poor welfare should still be entitled to claim either the return of the animal or claim reimbursement of its value, the court should have to give reasons for that decision. As a general rule, I do not think that such an offender should continue to care for the animal, nor should he be entitled to its value. If the court thinks that the situation is acceptable, such that he should continue to care for it or be entitled to its value, it should give an explanation as to why. If the court is merely doing what we would expect it to do in the majority of cases, we can see no reason for obliging it to state its reasons, as Amendment No. 122 suggests. I believe a conviction for one of those offences is sufficient reason for imposing a deprivation order. We believe that subsection (7) is important to ensure transparency of the court’s decisions and we do not agree that it would be appropriate to delete it in the way proposed in Amendment No. 121. We understand that the amendment stems from a concern that imposing a duty on a court only when it decides not to make a deprivation order will lead to a presumption in favour of making those orders. We think that that concern confuses cause and effect. In the majority of cases a deprivation order will be imposed. Where there has been a conviction for cruelty, in ordinary circumstances we think it entirely proper that a court should be encouraged to deprive the convicted person of his animals, unless the situation is exceptional. It is reasonable that the court should have to explain why it considers the case exceptional. Amendments Nos. 126 and 147 would be an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with the freedom of the court to perform its function by imposing extra costs and burdens. The court should appoint the most appropriate person to carry out an order and we are content that it will exercise its discretion appropriately in that respect. Carrying out a deprivation order under Clause 32 may mean little more than collecting a dog from a person’s house and taking it to a local sanctuary. We certainly see no need for a vet to do that, as Amendment No. 126 proposes. Clause 32 reflects the power already in the 1911 Act, and we are not aware of any problem that has occurred as a result of that. In practice, in certain circumstances, were the order to be for destruction, we cannot imagine that a court would delegate the task to anyone other than a vet. Likewise, caring for an animal pending an appeal may mean little more than keeping a hamster in one’s front room, feeding the animal and cleaning out the cage. While the court would ascertain that the person to whom it gave care of the animal was appropriate, I do not believe that there is any need for the court to embark on an investigation of the individual’s qualifications, training and experience as proposed by Amendment No. 147. If the court were dealing with farm, specialist or exotic animals, it would make that kind of investigation without doubt, but it would not be necessary in every case. I have tried to cover the points raised by noble Lords and I hope I have reassured them.