Animal Welfare Bill

moved Amendment No. 115:"Page 18, line 10, at end insert—" ““( ) The court shall not make an order for the destruction of an animal under this section unless it is satisfied, on the basis of evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, that it is appropriate to do so in the interests of the animal.”” The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 115 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 119, 121, 126 and 147. Amendments Nos. 115, 119, 126 and 147 address the same issue. They would ensure that no destruction could be ordered on an animal that has been taken from its owner without the decision being confirmed by scientific evidence given by a veterinary surgeon. Can the Minister give an assurance that destruction orders will not be the default setting of the courts? How will he be able to prevent that happening? There is a fine line in the Bill between introducing new offences and extra duties for courts regarding animal welfare and balancing out the needs of the animal. While it is not my intention to increase the burden on the courts, the destruction of animals for convenience is an effect that the Bill should not have. Amendment No. 121 deletes subsection (7) of Clause 32. I seek clarification from the Minister on this. Subsection (7) states:"““Where a court decides not to make an order under this section in relation to an offender, it shall—""(a) give its reasons for the decision in open court, and""(b) if it is a magistrates’ court, cause them to be entered in the register of its proceedings””." What is the difference? Presumably, in an open court everyone will understand the decisions and why they have been taken, whereas in a magistrates’ court the decisions will be entered into a register of the proceedings but will not necessarily be explained at the time. If that is so, we are concerned that that might lead to the making of an inappropriate deprivation or disqualification order. It would be much easier for a magistrate to make an order without having to give reasons than for him not to do so and to have to give reasons. I believe that is the situation, unless I am given clarification to the contrary. That could result in a presumption in favour of the additional penalties of deprivation or disqualification even where that is neither necessary nor desirable, with no basis in animal welfare. At the very least it would be preferable if the court had an equal duty to give the reasons where it does make an order as well as where does not. I seek clarification on that. I beg to move.