Animal Welfare Bill

Clause 18 provides a crucial and long overdue extension to the current law, alongside the new duty of care in Clause 9, and is the part of the Bill that will, in practice, allow the authorities to step in and take preventive action to stop an animal suffering, or starting to suffer. I am pleased that the Committee has approached this matter—and, I am sure, will continue to do so—in a positive way. We agree with the Committee that it is important that we get these powers right. We shall listen carefully to all that is said. Clause 18(3) contains a power to destroy an animal where a veterinary surgeon certifies that it is in its interests that it be destroyed. Amendment No. 88 concerns who should perform the destruction once the vet has given his opinion. As in the Protection of Animals Act 1911, veterinary advice on the state of the animal would normally be needed before destruction. Perhaps I shall be corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Soulsby, but I find it hard to see how a vet could give such advice over the phone. Sometimes the destruction is not carried out by a vet. For example, a slaughterman may shoot a group of animals in certain circumstances. Amendment No. 88 concerns who should perform the destruction once the vet has given his opinion. The important feature of subsection (3) as drafted is that it is the inspector or constable who makes the decision to destroy, on the vet’s advice. It is not the vet who has to bear this responsibility. The inspector or constable is a public authority figure, who can be held accountable if he makes the wrong decision. An action may lie against the vet in negligence if he wrongly certifies the condition of the animal, but as he is not a public authority figure, there will be no public redress against him. We think it is right that the decision whether to destroy rests with the inspector or constable. Further, I am mindful of the debate that we have already had on the issue of tail-docking, and hope that I do the veterinary profession no disservice in presuming that it would not seek such a responsibility. I emphasise, however, that we have no doubt that in the vast majority of cases it will be the vet who carries out the destruction. Noble Lords will see in subsection (3)(b) that the constable or inspector is empowered to arrange for the destruction of the animal, which in practice will mean that he can simply authorise the vet to carry out the destruction. I also draw the attention of noble Lords to the power in Section 11 of the 1911 Act, which is framed in the same way; the police constable takes the decision on the advice of the veterinary surgeon, and may either destroy the animal himself or arrange for another person to do it. He may, for example, authorise the vet to do it. Amendments Nos. 88, 89 and 90 relate to the power in Clause 18(4) to destroy an animal in distress without the certificate of a veterinary surgeon where it is not reasonably practicable to wait for a veterinary opinion. Amendment No. 89 seeks to remove this power entirely. We emphasise that, although the power in subsection (4) may appear wide, it is a reflection of Section 11 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. The only new element is that the power is extended to inspectors and not only to constables. This is a simple recognition of the current reality that, although the police have a role to play in the enforcement of animal welfare law, they are not the sole enforcers. Local authority inspectors and the State Veterinary Service inspecting farm premises are equally likely to encounter animals in distress and to need to exercise this power. Clause 18(4) should be used only in rare and extreme situations, but we consider it a vital element of the Bill. To remove it would be a retrograde step; it would take away a power already available to police constables. Amendment No. 90 seeks to substitute ““humanely destroy”” for ““act”” as the description of what the inspector or constable is empowered to do under this subsection. I appreciate the concern behind the amendment, and certainly agree that a Bill about animal welfare should not authorise the inhumane destruction of animals. Neither this power nor the Bill as a whole authorises inhumane destruction, although opinions might vary as to the best method of destroying an animal in some circumstances. The infliction of unnecessary pain is already highly likely to be an offence under the Bill. If the animal has to be destroyed in an emergency, as envisaged in Clause 18, what is appropriate and humane may vary depending on the circumstances, the degree of urgency and what is achievable at the scene. I hope noble Lords will note that the offence under Clause 4 of causing unnecessary suffering does not apply to the appropriate and humane destruction of an animal. It follows that if an inspector or a constable destroys an animal under Clause 18 inappropriately or inhumanely, he might commit an offence under Clause 4. Amendment No. 91 relates to the factors that an inspector or constable may take into account when assessing whether an animal is suffering for the purpose of deciding whether it should be taken into possession under subsection (5). We do not believe that the amendment adds anything of substance. An assessment of likelihood will inevitably involve consideration of the circumstances, and it is self-evident that an inspector who is aware that he took two animals from the same person last week will take that into consideration when deciding whether to seize another three animals later. Amendment No. 92 seeks to delete the power in subsection (8) for an inspector or constable to mark an animal for identification. It is still based on a misunderstanding of what is meant in Clause 18 by taking an animal into possession. It does not necessarily mean that the animals will be removed from the premises; it means taking over the care, which could be done in the current location. I am sure that noble Lords will recognise that it may be important, where there is a group of animals, to have the power to mark the animal so that it can be identified on the return of the inspector. The power in paragraph 8(2)(e) of Schedule 2 will not be sufficient for those purposes, because paragraph 8 powers do not apply to emergency situations. I know that the noble Baroness has discussed that before and I would be only too happy to discuss with her any further concerns that she has. Amendments Nos. 93 to 96 all concern the power under subsection (13) to recover expenses incurred in exercising emergency powers from the person responsible for the animal. Amendments Nos. 94 and 95 would insert requirements of good faith and reasonableness before expenses can be recovered, and Amendment No. 93 would remove the power altogether. We think it important to have the power to recover expenses. In some situations, an inspector or constable may incur significant expenses—for example, when collecting large farm animals, exotic animals requiring specialist handling, or large numbers of animals from animal hoarders. Inspectors and police should not have to bear the financial burden of such enforcement work. They are acting to stop animals suffering. As to whether we should introduce limitations of the kind proposed by Amendments Nos. 94 to 96, since the passage of the Human Rights Act, courts are under a duty to act in accordance with the convention rights. It would not be reasonable to order the reimbursement of expenses under Clause 18(13) where an inspector had not acted in good faith or had seized the animal unreasonably. Nor would it be reasonable to order that expenses be reimbursed if they were of an unreasonable quantity. Therefore, the amendments are unnecessary. They could have adverse implications for other provisions for the recovery of expenses. If ““reasonable”” is not included in other parts of the Bill, the implication is that there could be a difficulty throughout the Bill. I am sure that that is not what Members of the Committee intended. I appreciate that the spirit of the amendments is to introduce some kind of review into the legitimacy of the original seizure of the animal or animals. I do not agree that that this is the appropriate way to achieve that but, as I shall explain when we reach Clause 20, I have sympathy with the concern that there ought at some stage to be a review of the legitimacy of a seizure. We are considering how best that can be achieved and hope to contact noble Lords before Report with the Government’s view on the issue. I hope that I have responded to the points raised; if I have missed points, I shall write to Members of the Committee.