Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

I think that the matter should be seen in a wider context, and in that context I cannot answer my hon. Friend’s question. What I can say is that our party will discuss it with our noble Friends. Another of our concerns is that the amendments severely restrict the period during which the Committee’s veto can be exercised. Amendments Nos. 46 and 50 allow for the exercise of the veto in the negative and affirmative resolution procedure respectively only after a 30-day period commencing with the day on which the draft order is laid before Parliament. That means that the period during which the veto may be exercised is limited to just 10 days. While I understand the time limit, I wonder on reflection whether there is really a need to prevent a Committee from exercising its veto in the first 30 days following the laying of a draft order before Parliament. Perhaps the Minister could explain. In any event, we look forward to hearing the debate on the issue, particularly the debate on amendment (a), which was tabled by members of the Procedure Committee. Amendments Nos. 54 and 55 allow for the veto to be exercised under the super-affirmative procedure only during the period between the moment when the Minister lays a statement before Parliament detailing representations made on the draft order and the moment at which the order is voted on in both Houses and therefore approved. It is unclear how long the gap between the two events is estimated to be. Is it not feasible that they could occur within a matter of days of each other? We are also concerned about the conditions that must be met for a recommendation from a Committee to be valid. They appear onerous, and may provide the Government with a simple excuse to reject a Committee’s recommendation rather than resorting to an attempt to defeat the recommendation in the House. The factors listed in clause 3 that a Minister must take into account when introducing an order are essential. They provide a valuable safeguard, one of the few originally contained in the Bill before widespread criticisms forced the Government to back down. For that reason it is right that the Minister must consider those factors, but is it necessary for a parliamentary Committee—consisting, I am sure, of competent and respected parliamentarians—to have to take account of the same factors and more? The changes to the Bill announced recently by the Cabinet Office are vital from a constitutional viewpoint. They will help to prevent a Government from abusing the Bill and from being able to amend any legislation on the statute book, but imposing conditions on a Committee of Parliament that is carrying out its function of holding the Executive to account and preventing abuses of power is surely unnecessary and over-restrictive. Do the Government not consider a parliamentary Committee sufficiently responsible to make a wise enough decision on a draft order introduced under the Bill? For that reason we tabled amendment (b) to the Government’s amendments Nos. 50, 54 and 55, calling for the removal of subsections (2B), (4B) and (6B). We believe that such changes would create the robust and flexible veto that so many constitutional experts believe is vital to ensuring that the Executive do not abuse the power conferred on them by the Bill. Our concerns about the Government amendments appear to be shared by the Procedure Committee. I note that it has also tabled amendments to all the Government’s amendments relating to the statutory veto, calling for the omission from amendment No. 46 of proposed new subsections (2B) and (2C) and the corresponding subsections in amendments Nos. 50, 54 and 55. They would allow a Committee of either House to recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order. There would be no factors to consider and the onerous conditions imposed on the Committee by the Government amendments would cease to exist. I shall now discuss our further amendments to the Government amendments, which would prevent a Minister from tabling a draft order for a period of two years if the same or similar order had been vetoed by the relevant Select Committee. A two-year moratorium has been imposed on altering the regulatory reform order, but no such standstill period is contained in the proposals. I noted with interest that such a moratorium was also recommended in the Regulatory Reform Committee’s report. It was aimed at preventing a Minister who has just had an order vetoed from laying a similar order before Parliament. In recent years, we have seen a growing culture in which the Executive ignore the will of Parliament or, should I say, the people. Certainly, we see that happening in the European Union with underhand plans, now being implemented, to bring in by stealth elements of the failed constitution. In the UK, we see it in the Government bringing in their regionalisation plans—whether it be through primary care trust mergers, about which we heard earlier today, or in respect of the police—despite losing heavily in the north-east referendum. Our amendments are aimed at stopping that move towards legislation by stealth and regurgitation of failed plans. An important point about the statutory veto concerns the make-up of the Committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order. It is unclear in the Bill what type of Committee it should be. Is there to be a permanent Committee, charged with reviewing all orders issued under the Bill? If so, I draw the Minister’s attention to the Procedure Committee’s conclusion that parliamentary scrutiny of draft orders should not necessarily be in the hands of a single Committee responsible for all orders, as in the Bill, but be discharged by whatever Committee has the relevant subject expertise, including the departmental Select Committee. Will the Minister clarify which Committees the Government envisage undertaking those crucial roles? The Conservative party believes that the exercise of this veto, which was a central plank in the Government’s effort to placate the fears of opponents of the Bill and was recommended by both the Public Administration Committee and the Regulatory Reform Committee, should be far more flexible than is envisaged in the amendment. The opinion of a Select Committee charged with reporting on a draft order laid before Parliament under the Bill should carry more force. The should be a less restrictive time period for the exercise of the Committee’s recommendation, and fewer conditions should be imposed on the exercise of that recommendation.