Animal Welfare Bill

My Lords, first, I declare some interests with respect to the Bill: first, as chairman of the Companion Animal Welfare Council; secondly, as president of the Pet Advisory Committee; and, thirdly, as chairman of the Ethics Committee of the British Veterinary Association. Along with my noble friend Lady Byford, I believe that the Bill represents a major step forward in advancing the welfare of animals—particularly companion animals. Hitherto, as the Minister said, the major legislation on animal welfare has been the Protection of Animals Act 1911, which has been particularly beneficial to production livestock—that is, farm animals. Much of the legislation has resulted from knowledge of the physiology and welfare needs of such animals. Companion animals, such as dogs, cats, rodents, birds and fish, have been less fortunate owing to the large number of species kept for companionship and the lack of knowledge regarding their welfare needs. Indeed, much of the welfare need has yet to be researched. Fortunately, we have left behind the Cartesian doctrine that regarded animals as automata—like clocks, capable of complex behaviour but incapable of speech, constructive reasoning and especially of feeling pain. That refuge of thought has long since been discarded and replaced by an increasing recognition that the quality of life of an animal must be a focal point in considering its welfare. From an evolutionary point of view, one accepts a continuity of development between all animals and man, and that there are only quantitative but not qualitative differences between human and non-human minds. An important question is: how close to human consciousness and expectation do animals come in the evolutionary scale? We now accept that the great apes have complex mental abilities similar in many ways to those of humans, and an ability to empathise with thoughts and feelings of each other. At which point down the evolutionary scale do animals lose the abilities ascribed to the great apes? Clearly, this will vary greatly according to the species of animal and thus, with respect to companion animals, it is difficult to enact one law to suit all needs. Nevertheless, the Bill contains very important generalisations, one of which is the duty of care, whereby the owner or keeper of an animal is under a legal obligation to provide for the needs of an animal in his keeping. It also gives authority for action to be taken before an animal actually suffers cruelty. An important new concept is that a person must take reasonable steps in all circumstances to provide for the needs of an animal for which he is responsible, and ensure that they are met to the extent required by good practice. Animals’ needs are well expressed in Clause 9 by what has become known as the five freedoms, originally applied to farm animals but equally applicable to companion animals. It is worth rereading those, but I shall not repeat them here. An important corollary to Clause 9—the duty of care—is the ability of an inspector to issue an improvement notice if a person is failing to comply with the duties laid down in Clause 9. It is my strong opinion that it should be an offence for a person not to comply with an improvement notice. I very much favour debarring a person from keeping an animal if he has been demonstrated to be unfit to comply with an act as detailed in Clause 33, which is on disqualifications. It is my understanding—perhaps the Minister will clarify this—that in Scotland a similar Act has been strengthened by a ““care notice”” with respect to lack of compliance with an improvement notice. There are a number of issues that lend themselves to regulations rather than being on the face of the Bill. However, I believe one issue requires attention; namely, abandonment. My noble friend Lady Byford mentioned this. It is an unfortunate fact that many animals are abandoned for a variety of reasons and are left to survive as best they can. Some are simply strays; others become feral, scavenging on garbage and other waste; and some are dangerous to themselves or to traffic and people on the streets. Some are taken in by welfare organisations or sanctuaries where they are cared for and nursed back to health and acceptable behaviour. Subsequently, such animals may be placed in a foster home. However, it is still possible for the original owner to claim ownership of an animal that he abandoned in the first place, to the distress of the surrogate owner and the welfare society. I share the view of my noble friend Lady Byford that a clause is required to attend to that. Of the issues that I believe lend themselves to regulations, I would include the use of electronic devices for the control of companion animals, such as dogs in urban situations and pet fairs, which is another issue. It is important that regulations are framed having regard to adequate scientific knowledge of the use of electronic devices, or that such knowledge is acquired before regulations are made. An issue which I am sure has generated a massive amount of lobbying mail is the docking of dogs’ tails. Docking is considered a mutilation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, of which I had the honour to be president some 10 years ago, and by the British Veterinary Association, which condemns it except for therapeutic purposes. The Bill will permit the docking of puppies’ tails provided a veterinary surgeon can certify on evidence provided by the owner that the dog is a working dog likely to be used for work in certain activities, and that it is not more than five days of age. I believe this places a veterinary surgeon in an almost impossible position, knowing that in any litter of puppies not all will be destined for work. Further, he is expected to certify an action on his behalf on evidence provided by another person—an action which any veterinary surgeon would resist. From my early days as a veterinary surgeon, I can say that I would resist it. But a more serious misapprehension associated with the docking of puppies’ tails is the question of whether the puppy will feel pain on being docked at three days of age. Recent studies have shown that a foetus can respond to painful stimuli, as can a neonate. The important issue of pain reception is that of the descending control of a sensory input which develops post-natally. This control sends inhibitory messages to lower levels of the nervous system, switching input off at the point of entry if required. Descending control develops post-natally and slowly, and in very young pre-term infant humans has very little development and in animal models has virtually none. Hence, rather than feel no pain, it is likely that the puppy at three days has not developed the mechanism to down-regulate painful impulses derived from the docking procedure. That is the opposite of what is maintained by those who state that pain transmission is not developed at three days. The major bodies of the veterinary profession in the United Kingdom recommend that docking should be prohibited, as in Scotland. Evidence from other countries where docking is prohibited—for example, Norway—does not indicate that there is significant increase in tail damage in dogs which have not been docked but which worked in circumstances previously thought liable to damage the tail. In summary, this is a good Bill. I am reminded of the phrase attributed to Mahatma Ghandi—that the way a nation treats its animals is a mark of its civilisation. Though there are contentious issues in the Bill, these should not detract from its importance as a significant move forward in the welfare of animals and the way we treat them.