Identity Cards Bill

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 47, 48, 50 and 51, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 47A, 48A, 50A and 51A. Amendments Nos. 47 and 48 would have the effect that the National Identity Scheme Commissioner would be appointed by Her Majesty rather than by the Secretary of State. Noble Lords will be aware that to a certain extent this is a presentational issue. There will be very little difference in practical terms whether the National Identity Scheme Commissioner is appointed by Her Majesty or by the Secretary of State. There are a variety of different statutory commissioners; some are appointed by Her Majesty, some are appointed by the Prime Minister and some are appointed by the Secretary of State. An example of a commissioner who is appointed by the Secretary of State is the Immigration Services Commissioner, whose general duty is to promote good practice on the part of those who provide immigration advice. Of the commissioners who are appointed by Her Majesty, there are those, such as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, who nevertheless report to the Secretary of State. As the House will be aware, the Police and Justice Bill merges those two inspectorates and a number of others into Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector for Justice, Community Safety and Custody, who will report to the Secretary of State, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General. It is therefore clear that, as a general rule, statutory commissioners report to a relevant Minister or Ministers. That is the case regardless of the mechanism of their appointment. The Information Commissioner is an exception. He is appointed by Her Majesty by Letters Patent, is a corporation sole and reports directly to Parliament. It is appropriate for the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to be appointed by the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State will have ultimate responsibility for the effective and efficient operation of the identity cards agency and it is right therefore that the commissioner should report to and be appointed by the Secretary of State. I assure the House that the appointment of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner will follow the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments rules and code of practice, as well as Home Office guidance on the appointment of public appointments made by Ministers. Amendment No. 50 would result in the commissioner reporting directly to Parliament rather than to the Secretary of State, who would then lay the reports before Parliament. Amendment No. 51 would have the effect that the commissioner, not the Secretary of State, would have the final say over which matters would be excluded from his reports on the basis that publication would be prejudicial to national security or to the prevention or detection of crime. We consider it necessary for the commissioner’s report to be addressed to the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State—albeit in consultation with the commissioner—to remain responsible for determining which parts of the reports should be excluded before the reports are laid before Parliament. Noble Lords will be aware that there are precedents for the removal of sensitive aspects of reports of statutory commissioners before they are laid before Parliament. For example, similar mechanisms apply in relation to the Surveillance Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner, and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. It is our view that Clause 25 of the Bill contains adequate safeguards to ensure that there is sufficient scrutiny of the commissioner’s reports. All reports prepared by the commissioner will be laid before Parliament. In addition, there are only two reasons why matters may be excluded from the report that is laid before Parliament—if the publication of the material would be prejudicial to national security or to the prevention and detection of crime. It is important to understand that, simply because a matter has been excluded from one report, it does not follow that the information will never be made public.  If, for example, a matter was excluded due to an ongoing criminal investigation, once that matter was concluded there would be no reason why it could not appear in any subsequent reports. I simply do not think that the commissioner is the right person to make the decision about what should be excluded from his report. The Secretary of State, by virtue of his overarching responsibility, has a thorough overview of issues affecting national security and the prevention and detection of crime. For the amendment to be workable—that is to say, for the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to be capable of making an informed decision about what should and should not be excluded from the report—he would have to be briefed on national security and crime in the way that the Secretary of State is. Aside from being a disproportionate way of ensuring that certain sensitive information does not get into the public domain, that would significantly change the nature of the commissioner’s role. Noble Lords will be aware that these amendments were disagreed to in the other place. These amendments were put to the vote and the will of the elected House was that they should not be accepted. We therefore believe that this House should accept the views of the other place and not press the Motion to a Division. I therefore ask noble Lords not to insist on amendments Nos. 47, 48, 50 and 51. I hope, however, that noble Lords will feel that those amendments have served a useful purpose, because we have been able to debate them and to look carefully at how the commissioner will operate. That has meant that we have a greater degree of understanding and expectation of how the whole system will work. I hope that that will have reassured the House. I beg to move. Moved, That this House do not insist on its Amendments 47, 48, 50 and 51, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 47A, 48A, 50A and 51A.—(Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)