Identity Cards Bill

moved Amendment No. 24:"Page 2, line 7, leave out paragraphs (b) to (f)." The noble Earl said: The Minister might imagine that the underlying purpose of the amendment is destructive. I hope to offer her some reassurance by advising that my aim here is merely to probe a few issues. I am also grateful to other noble Lords who have been more imaginative than me in tabling amendments to constrain the terms of the individual categories of information. First, the registrable facts encapsulated in paragraphs (b) to (f) cannot be interpreted as identifiers of an individual’s identity. Indeed, if we consider the drafting of Schedule 1(1), these categories are defined as ““personal””, rather than ““identifying”” information. This point was reinforced by the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform and in its observation that registrable facts are,"““not necessarily limited to information needed to prove identity . . . and extends to matters such as previous addresses, terms of residence in different parts of the UK and elsewhere and an ‘audit trail’ of disclosure of register entries””." Of course, I acknowledge that these categories of data will be of benefit in terms of corroborating an individual’s identity. Nevertheless, as I shall seek to demonstrate, the scope and range of the information required is wholly disproportionate. As I understand it, these categories of information comprise more data than that required to be given to the police for individuals placed on the Sexual and Violent Offender Register. By way of illustration, paragraphs (c) and (d) impose the requirement for the individual to record every address at which he or she has been resident and for how long,"““in the United Kingdom or elsewhere””." For the vast majority, this represents a huge amount of data. For example, will Members of Parliament have to update their information on the register on a weekly basis to indicate the periods that they have resided in London and the periods they have resided in their constituencies? More seriously, the provision appears to include periods of residence overseas, periods of residence of children, periods of residence at school or university, and so on. It has to be questionable whether we will all have the capacity to remember the precise details of where we have resided for every moment of our lives. That is a significant consideration, given that failure to provide the prescribed information could incur liability for a civil penalty. Additionally, given the drafting, individuals may be required to register residential circumstances such as extended treatment in hospitals and periods spent at clinics or refuges; for example, in respect of mental illness, that would involve hospice care for the terminally ill or safe houses for victims of domestic violence. Equally, individuals may be required to indicate periods of residence when serving sentences of imprisonment—something which would be, on the face of it, anti-pathetic to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. A requirement to register such information, irrespective of whether it is intrusive, not to say insensitive, could be said to contravene the Data Protection Act in respect of sensitive personal data. Despite protestations from the Government, subsection (6) is a very small fig leaf; after all, it bars the recording of sensitive personal data only in respect of subsection (5)(g). However, even if it were drafted to include residential data, as envisaged by Amendment No. 38, tabled in the names of my noble friends, I am uncertain that that would resolve the problem. As is so often the case with database management, omission of data, and what can be inferred from that omission, can be just as revealing and intrusive as their inclusion. Were incomplete records to be justified on data protection grounds then, by definition, where a gap in an individual’s record of residence exists, that period would have to relate to sensitive personal data. In such circumstances, it would be a relatively simple matter, as a function of probability, to tie the period to a specific life event such as a prison sentence. The problem here is that an individual’s whole life experience can be deduced merely by reference to where they have lived and for how long. The residential information, or its absence from the register, may not per se qualify as being sensitive, but what can be inferred from it most assuredly is. In effect, the Government’s oft-repeated claim that no sensitive data, as defined by the Data Protection Act, will be held on the register would seem to be just so much window-dressing. Inevitably, all those difficulties also arise in respect of paragraph (b). Individuals will be required to record their current residential details irrespective of any element of sensitive personal data with which such information may be imbued. For example, is it really the Government’s intention that terminally ill patients living out their days in a hospice will be required to record that fact in the register? There is also the problem of how it is anticipated that, for example, rough sleepers or Travellers will register their details. In effect, will ““no fixed abode”” be an adequate answer? There may also be potential problems with paragraphs (e) and (f). Asylum seekers who have fled persecution will be required in effect to make that fact plain in the register, thereby potentially exposing themselves to the risk of retribution. All in all, the construction of those categories of residential information is disproportionate to the purpose that they are intended to achieve. It sanctions pervasive capture of sensitive personal data for inclusion in the register in contravention of the Data Protection Act. I therefore look forward to the Minister’s explanation of the logic on which the Government’s drafting is based. I beg to move.