NHS Redress Bill [HL]

Perhaps I may intervene and, in doing so, declare an indirect interest. It was my privilege to serve on what became known as the Richard commission, which was established by the Assembly, under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Richard, to look into the further powers that might be devolved to the Welsh Assembly. I had the privilege of serving on that commission and helping to draft the report. Chapter 13 of the report explored the possibilities of framework legislation developing within the existing structure of the devolution settlement agreed under the Government of Wales Act 1998, and of allowing greater freedom for the Assembly to use its legislative powers to develop its own policy and legislative framework within that policy. This clause is a kind of parent of that recommendation; it foreshadows the White Paper Better Governance for Wales. I therefore make a plea to the Committee to support the principle of the clause and its framework nature for two reasons. When I served on the commission, all its members were deeply impressed by the way in which the Assembly dealt with its subordinate legislative powers. We are not, in this case, transferring power to Ministers but to a totally democratic elected National Assembly. There is a big distinction between that and subordinate legislation in the United Kingdom, which is transferred to Ministers. Both Houses have, quite rightly, jealously safeguarded the transfer of those executive functions into subordinate legislation. In this case, Clause 17 will transfer powers to the democratically elected National Assembly. Secondly, anyone who inspects the scrutiny procedures that have been established to deal with such regulatory power will realise that there are substantial safeguards. They are elaborately laid down in the Government of Wales Act and the consultation processes are usually exhaustive. The relevant pieces of the subordinate legislation are crawled over by the Assembly’s relevant subject committee as well as being scrutinised by a committee dealing with subordinate legislation in general. They are debated and, I believe, are also subject to amendment. Unlike the subordinate legislation in the United Kingdom, which is not amendable but is subject to either the negative or affirmative procedure, the subordinate legislation in the Assembly is subject to amendment. Effectively, one often gets the equivalent of a primary legislative process occurring in subordinate legislation. It is thorough and is subject to considerable consultation. When I was helping to draft Chapter 13 of the Richard commission report, this was the kind of clause I envisaged. It foreshadows the Bill that the Government will introduce later in the Session to carry forward some of the proposals in the Richard commission. I appreciate that this may be seen as jumping the gun, but it is a sensible proposal. In the previous Parliament, considerable discretion was granted to the Assembly to use its subordinate legislative powers in two health Acts. I believe that in this case we could and should trust that democratically elected body with powers of this kind. It will have to fund the scheme, implement it and be accountable for it. Therefore, I beg the Committee to accept what is, I agree, an exceptional clause, offering exceptional powers. However, it is in a very different context from that which we traditionally have when we give powers to Ministers. This will give powers to an elected Assembly.