Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

My Lords, we are not. The reason why there is particular focus on those people is because they incite hatred and violence, not because they are a member of the Muslim faith. That is the critical difference. I wanted briefly to outline the legislative context, because it shows that Parliament has decided in the past that incitement to hatred represents a gap in the criminal law and that it is legitimate for this to be addressed by legislation. It also shows that we have recognised that people can suffer harm because of their religious beliefs, that this is wrong and that we should make specific provision to cover such situations. I am aware of the concern that has been expressed by some that, even if the Bill does not limit freedom of speech in the way that has been suggested and even if it does not lead to prosecutions involving religious debate, it will have a chilling effect nevertheless on such activity. Again, I would suggest that those who are making these claims look at the way in which the racial incitement offences have operated since they have included Jews and Sikhs, and how the religious incitement offences have operated in Northern Ireland. There is no evidence that these have had a chilling effect on religious debate. I turn to the detail of the Bill. It consists of just three clauses and a schedule. Clause 1 gives effect to the schedule. The schedule amends Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 to create offences which involve the stirring-up of hatred against groups of persons on the grounds of religious belief or lack of religious belief. It also amends the existing offences of racial hatred. The Bill therefore brings in the new offences by extending the existing law on incitement to racial hatred rather than creating a new, self-standing set of offences. I understand that this way of drafting legislation by amending existing law does not make it terribly easy to read, and I apologise for that. I have therefore arranged for a version of the Public Order Act, as it will be amended by the Bill, to be placed in the Library of the House, which I hope will help noble Lords in their consideration of the Bill. As I indicated in answer to the question of my noble friend Lord Wedderburn, the schedule does not define what amounts to religious belief. I know that this too is of concern to some noble Lords, but I point out that religious belief is not defined in the context of the religiously aggravated offences, which already exist, and this does not seem to have caused a problem. Religion is not defined also in relation to discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 and, again, we are not aware that that has caused any problems whatever; nor are we intending to define what a religion is in the context of the religious discrimination provisions in Part 2 of the Equality Bill. It will therefore be for the courts, as they have already done, to decide what constitutes a religious belief for the purposes of this legislation. In doing so, they will take into account existing case law on the issue; for example, the case of Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom suggests that any religious belief will need to attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. As I said in answer to the question of the noble Earl, the beliefs must also be worthy of respect in a democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity. We expect, therefore, that religious beliefs that advocate child abuse or violence would not be protected by the Bill. As for groups such as Scientologists or the Moonies, it may be that the courts will decide that their beliefs equate to religious beliefs. However, we need to be clear that what we are talking about is stirring-up of hatred against people, not their beliefs, and that, just because people might have beliefs which seem objectionable, it would be wrong for the law to state that it was okay for hatred to be stirred up against them. The schedule also makes a clarifying amendment to the existing offence of stirring up hatred against persons on racial grounds. This will make it clear that material must only be likely to be seen by someone in whom hatred was likely to be stirred up. Clause 2 results from an amendment to the Bill that was made in the other place. It means that citizens’ arrests cannot be made in relation to the offences of incitement to either racial or religious hatred. Finally, Clause 3 makes it clear that the proposed legislation applies to England and Wales only. Section 27(1) of the Public Order Act provides that the amended racial and religious hatred offences will require the consent of the Attorney-General, as I have already mentioned, before prosecutions can be instituted. That, together with the high threshold of hatred, means that spurious and vexatious cases will not come to court. In drawing to a close, I shall briefly touch on the issue of blasphemy, as I am sure it will be raised in the debate this afternoon. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary made clear during Second Reading of the Bill in the other place that any reform or repeal of the law on blasphemy must begin on a considered basis across all faiths. Therefore, before we can take any action in this area, we shall need to undertake a proper consultation with the public and the stakeholders and we shall need to examine the issues in detail. In the light of that, we do not believe that this Bill is an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the law on blasphemy.