Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

No, my Lords, it is not. The problem with the Public Order Act is where you are addressing people other than the people whom you are insulting or abusing with a view to stirring up hatred among them against a particular religious group. That is not currently covered by the criminal law, and that is why there is a gap that needs to be covered. Let us be clear, it is a small gap in the criminal law capturing, as I just said in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, behaviour that is not already covered by the existing common law offences of incitement or by offences in the Public Order Act. It is nevertheless a gap in the law that can be exploited by those who seek to sow the seeds of hatred against some of our most vulnerable communities. These are rule issues, not theoretical issues. Muslims of all races, including white Muslims, have been victims of hatred. And incitement to hatred against so-called infidels and apostates by religious extremists is also a very real phenomenon in some communities. I am sure that we all accept as a matter of principle that this is something that the criminal law should seek to address. Indeed, the Association of Chief Police Officers’ representative, when asked by the Select Committee on Religious Offences about the disturbances in Bradford in 2001, said that the sort of material this offence would outlaw,"““did significantly impact upon the situation . . . I agree that incitement to hatred on religious grounds would make a significant difference in terms of our ability to deal with this kind of material””." The offences in the Bill are all the more necessary because there is an inequality in the level of protection provided to Jews and Sikhs and to other faith groups. Jews and Sikhs, as a result of case law, are protected from having hatred stirred up against them under the existing offences of incitement to racial hatred. We believe that the same level of protection should apply to all faith groups and to those without religious belief. Again, I am sure that most of your Lordships will agree that this is a laudable aim—that it cannot be right that the law protects some communities and not others. The question is whether we have achieved our aims in the Bill and the argument here is whether, as drafted, the Bill would have unintended and unacceptable consequences in relation to freedom of speech. The Bill will impact on freedom of speech just as the incitement to racial hatred offence does. That, we believe, is right because there are words and actions that should have no place in civilised society. But, of course, what we must guard against is going too far, and this will be—I am sure—the central focus of the debate this afternoon. We believe that the Bill will not have an undue effect on freedom of speech. In particular it will not stop the telling of jokes about religion or the ridiculing of faith. It will not close down debate about religious beliefs or stop artists from dealing with religious subjects. We believe that this will not happen for the following reasons. First, the offences require that the language or behaviour be ““threatening, abusive or insulting””. Legitimate debate and discussion about those who follow a particular faith does not use that type of language. Secondly, the person accused of the offence needs to have either intended that his language or behaviour would stir up hatred against others or for it to have been likely that his actions would have that effect. Comedians do not intend to stir up hatred and their performances are not likely to do so. The third safeguard is that it is about stirring up hatred. This is a high threshold. Hatred is about intense dislike. It is not about ridicule or contempt. The hatred also needs to be directed against a group of people, that is against a community defined by its religious beliefs or lack of beliefs. It is not about protecting individuals and it is not about protecting their beliefs. It is not, despite what some might say, a new blasphemy law. Next, the Bill does not criminalise anything done in a person’s home. It will not catch what is said at a private occasion in somebody’s home no matter how offensive it might be. Finally, the prosecution of any of the offences proposed in the Bill requires the consent of the Attorney-General. This is an important safeguard that will ensure that only the most serious cases come before the courts. The Attorney-General’s consent is, of course, in addition to the Crown Prosecution Service’s public interest and evidential tests—