Civil Procedure (Modification of Crown Proceedings Act 1947) Order 2005 

rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Civil Procedure (Modification of Crown Proceedings Act 1947) Order 2005. The noble Lord said: The Government seek to promote access to justice. To do this, we continue to seek to modernise the civil justice system. But anachronisms remain, which include some of the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. These put the Crown—in this context, government departments and their agencies—in a more favourable position than other litigants. For example, the Crown rather is able to determine the venue for these cases rather than the court. As a result, a litigant in person in, say, Newcastle might be required to attend court in London when the matter could equally be settled at a court more convenient to him or her, thus saving time and money. In all other cases, the court decides the most appropriate venue for the case, applying the overriding objective of the civil procedure rules that cases are dealt with justly. There will always be circumstances in which the Crown’s position merits special consideration and the changes will not affect substantive Crown immunity. I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate the reason for retaining this provision, but some of the current provisions are outdated and need to be changed. We want a civil justice system that is fit for the 21st century. The order before the Committee is a step in that direction. It will enable my department to make changes to rules of court to do away with the outdated measures contained in the 1947 Act. At this point I should like to thank the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, the independent committee which makes the rules of court, and the Government Legal Service for its sterling work that formed the basis of the consultation exercise carried out last year. The results of the consultation exercise were overwhelmingly in favour of the change. By supporting this resolution, noble Lords will enable us, through the Rule Committee, to better meet the needs of ordinary litigants. In summary, the changes we propose are as follows. The Lord Chancellor proposes to use the powers contained in Section 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Act   1997 to amend the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. Most significantly, this will be a repeal of Section 19, relating to venue; of Section 20(1), relating to the   removal and transfer of proceedings; and of Section 35(2)(c) and (d), which relate to summary and default judgments. At the same time, the Rule Committee will take the opportunity to unify and streamline the rules of court relating to proceedings by and against the Crown. These are currently contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court Order 77 and the County Court Rules Order 42. The revised rules will form Part 66, a new part, of the Civil Procedure Rules. Let me set out briefly some background to these proposals. In 1999, fundamental changes were introduced to streamline and simplify the civil justice system. By and large, the civil justice procedures in the High Court and the County Court have been unified through the Civil Procedure Rules. I have already mentioned the overriding objective of the Rules, which is to deal with cases justly. In practice this means ensuring that parties are on an equal footing; the saving of expense; dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate; ensuring cases are dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and allotting to cases an appropriate share of the court’s resources. These underpin the changes to Crown proceedings which are before the Committee today. So what changes will this order bring about to the law governing Crown proceedings? First, the Crown will no longer have the power to determine the venue for proceedings. Having abolished the Crown’s prerogative to specify the venue for trial, the new rules will give the court the same power to determine venue as they currently exercise in other cases. The court can then take into consideration the requirements, preferences and circumstances of both parties in deciding an appropriate venue. It may well be that many cases will continue to be held at the Royal Courts of Justice in London if there is a public interest issue at stake. Secondly, the new rules remove the inequality that allows the Crown to obtain a summary judgment but denies a similar right against the Crown. Summary judgments arise when either a claimant or defendant is able to show that the other party has no real prospect of succeeding in their case and there is no other compelling reason why a trial is necessary. Now either party in cases involving the Crown can ask for a summary judgment. However, because of the volume of litigation by and against the Crown, and because papers are often sent to the wrong address of the government department, the new rules will allow the   other party to seek summary judgment only after the time for filing a defence has expired. We are proposing to retain the rules relating to summary applications to the High Court in revenue matters. This is because there is usually a straightforward issue of law or fact involved, such as the payment of revenue due to the Crown where payment has been withheld improperly. Thirdly, in future a person suing the Crown will be able to obtain a default judgment against the Crown where no defence or acknowledgement of service has been received. Again, because of the volume of cases against the Crown and the potential difficulties for the Crown in identifying the relevant cause of litigation, certain safeguards will be put in place. Decisions on default judgments against the Crown will be made by a Master in the High Court or a district judge in a County Court, who must be satisfied that documents have been properly served on the Crown. We are not proposing to change the law in relation to enforcing judgments against the Crown. The Crown is expected to uphold the civil law by complying with court orders. In any event, many of the general rules on enforcement are inappropriate for dealing with the Crown such as, to use an extreme example, the seizing of Ministry of Defence tanks! We therefore propose to maintain the current exclusion of the Crown from certain enforcement provisions, including general rules on enforcement and orders to obtain information from debtors. The unified Civil Procedure Rules brought about a clearer set of rules that, in particular, are easier for litigants in person to understand. You will see from the order that many of the changes are designed to reflect that philosophy. The changes that I have just outlined are based on the premise that the same rules that apply between individuals and businesses should apply to the Crown, unless convincing justification can be shown for retaining special procedures. They represent a significant improvement for litigants and are consistent with the aims of the civil justice reforms of placing the Crown on a more equal footing with other litigants; providing unified and streamlined Rules of Court; potentially reducing delay and costs and promoting access to justice for all. If these improvements are to be implemented, it will be necessary to amend the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. This order does just that, enabling the revocation of the important but possibly obstructive Crown privileges—determining the venue for cases and total immunity from summary and default judgments. By approving the order before the Committee, a number of disadvantages for ordinary litigants will be removed. I beg to move. Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Civil Procedure (Modification of Crown Proceedings Act 1947) Order   2005 [First report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Evans of Temple Guiting.)