Equality Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 80:"Page 4, line 11, at end insert ““, and" (   )   conduct its affairs in the public interest and with an appropriate degree of independence”” The noble Baroness said: Clause 8(1) instructs the commission on the manner in which it shall both achieve the aims of the Bill and, at the same time, on how it shall exercise the substantial powers it is given to enable it to do so. Most, if not all, of the list in paragraphs (a) to (g) of subsection (1) will be found in the Acts which the Bill, in effect, consolidates; for example, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Rights Commission Act 1999. But there is one notable addition required to that list, and the purpose of this amendment is purely to rectify that omission. The amendment instructs the commission to conduct its affairs both in the public interest and with an appropriate degree of independence. It is probable that the second strand of that instruction is much more significant, because being obliged to conduct its affairs in the public interest should merely be regarded as dotting the ““i’s”” and crossing the ““t’s”” of any statutory organisation fulfilling a quasi-judicial function. However, underlining the need for the commission to act independently is extremely relevant. Let me say at once that I am not in any way impugning the integrity or mindset of any chairmen, present or past, of the bodies that are being amalgamated into this   organisation, nor of any future chairman of the new commission that the Bill is creating. What concerns us   and what should concern the Government—any   government—is that the commission should be independent of any pressure or attempt to influence its activities and decisions either by the Government or any Minister or senior official, or even by some populist campaign by any part of the media. In the latter respect I emphatically do not single out the so-called red-top newspapers, and by ““senior official”” I include chairmen of public inquiries who may look into a particular problem and come to a particular conclusion, suggesting a particular remedy. In that case, the commission, while taking the inquiry report into account, should not consider itself absolutely bound to follow its conclusions and recommendations, thereby having its statutory functions usurped. What gives us concern about the potential danger to the independence of the commission is the number of times throughout the Bill that the Secretary of State is given power to direct the commission to carry out certain functions. For example, Clause 15(4) provides that:"““The Commission shall comply with a direction of the Secretary of State to issue a code””." Clause 17(1)(a) provides that the commission,"““shall comply with a direction of the Sectary of State to conduct an inquiry””." Clause 22(2) provides that:"““The Commission shall investigate a matter specified in subsection (1) if directed to do so by the Secretary of State””," and so on. I have found similar instances scattered throughout the Bill. I do not wish to take up your Lordships’ time by enumerating them all because I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and his colleagues have tabled a large number of amendments to reduce the influence of the Secretary of State on the work of the commission. Some of those amendments have already been spoken to and some remain to be called. Indeed, my inspiration for the wording of this amendment was   that used by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in Section 39(2)(b) of his Equality Bill in 2003, which your Lordships passed. I also do not include either Henry VIII provisions in the Bill giving the Secretary of State power to amend legislation or the power to issue instructions to cover the transition from the three commissions to just one. What concerns me is, first, that the commission should not be seen as a mere political instrument of the Government; and, secondly, that the power to direct the commission’s activities in those particular circumstances should not create an atmosphere within the commission that makes it feel that it should, even in cases where there is no such direction, take into account what it supposes, rightly or wrongly, are the views of the Government. Perhaps I may suggest an admittedly extreme and hypothetical example to illustrate the point. Let us suppose that a Minister had pronounced The Satanic Verses an affront to the Muslim community—which I am absolutely certain no Minister has ever done or ever would do. That would be no reason for the commission to take or support any action against Mr   Rushdie or to institute any inquiry of its own volition unless it independently came to the same conclusion. This is essentially a probing amendment. We seek an unequivocal statement from the Government that the commission can rely on the fact that it will be able to carry out its functions without the Secretary of State breathing down its neck or pursuing it with a stream of suggestions, memos and e-mails. In other words, we   seek a statement that, despite the fact that the commissioners are appointed by the Government and hold office at the Secretary of State’s pleasure, the commission truly is independent, as any quasi-judicial organisation ought to be. I beg to move.